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PORTUGAL AT THE EYE 
OF THE STORM: 
CRISIS, AUSTERITY 
AND THE MEDIA
Abstract
The governmental change which took place in Portugal 
after 2011 was far more than just a new episode in the typi-
cal rotation between the two major political parties given 
that it occurred whilst the country was initiating a three 
year period of external fi nancial control. As such the three 
political forces actively engaged in this rough transition 
have consistently pursued a stern austerity strategy imposed 
by creditors. This uneven platform (shaped by submission 
rather than by accord) has been the breeding ground for 
a discourse centred on the existence of a broad national 
consensus in support of the adopted draconian austerity 
measures. Irruptions of dissent have been met with con-
tempt and have been dismissed as self-interested opinions 
or even as anti-patriotic. This article has four main parts. In 
the fi rst one, the fundamental features of the economic and 
fi nancial crisis and its consequences will be presented. In the 
second part, the political impacts and challenges of the crisis 
will be scrutinised. The political and economic impact is 
closely articulated with the current situation of mainstream 
media that is presented in the third part of the paper. As we 
will see in the last part of this article, a particular combina-
tion of factors in a country without fi nancial sovereignty has 
created the perfect conditions for media reproduction of the 
government and creditors’ discourses.
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Introduction
The governmental change which took place in Portugal after 2011 was far more 
than just a new episode in the typical rotation between the two major political 
parties given that it occurred whilst the country was initiating a three year peri-
od of external ﬁ nancial control by the troika (European Commission, European 
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund). The socialists negotiated the 
ﬁ nancial package having already resigned and the social-democrat lead coalition 
was voted into power on the basis of promises it could not keep (namely on tax-
ation, salaries, and pensions). As such – even when eě orts were made to create a 
separation between them – the three political forces actively engaged in this rough 
transition have consistently pursued a stern austerity strategy imposed by credi-
tors. This uneven platform (shaped by submission rather than by accord) has been 
the breeding ground for a discourse centred on the existence of a broad national 
consensus in support of the adopted draconian austerity measures. Irruptions of 
dissent have been met with contempt and have been dismissed as self-interested 
opinions or even as anti-patriotic.
The mainstream media’s adhesion to this government fuelled discursive 
construct owed as much to traditional dependencies between media and power 
structures – in November 2012 the Prime Minister, Passos Coelho, would remark 
that journalists should shy away from a “sickening debate” on “what might go 
wrong”1 – as it did to three interconnected and overlapping processes: problems 
derived from mounting challenges arising from digitalisation, the eě ects of the 
ﬁ nancial crisis itself on media revenues, and the changes in their property and 
management structures ensuing the steady entry of Angolan capital.
For these reasons mainstream media’s aĴ ention has not strayed from a funda-
mentally inward looking focus – even in the usage of external references to Por-
tugal’s situation – hence being on the whole unable to open up space for broader 
debates on mid and long terms European options.
This article has four main parts. In the ﬁ rst one, the fundamental features of 
the economic and ﬁ nancial crisis and its consequences will be presented. In the 
second part, the political impacts and challenges of the crisis will be scrutinised. 
The political and economic impact is closely articulated with the current situation of 
mainstream media that is presented in the third part of the paper. As we will see in 
the last part of this article, a particular combination of factors in a country without 
ﬁ nancial sovereignty has created the perfect conditions for media reproduction of 
the government and creditors’ discourses.
Recipe for Disaster
“There is probably nothing more diĜ  cult to explain in our [Portuguese] eco-
nomic policy over the last four or ﬁ ve decades than the decision to join the Euro,” 
says João Ferreira do Amaral, a professor of Economics and a long standing critic 
of the Eurozone, in the book “Porque devemos sair do Euro”2 (2013, 93). Like 
others opposed to the Euro and the end of the monetary independence with the 
disappearance of the national currency, Amaral says that the country has lost the 
possibility of correcting external imbalances based on currency depreciation and 
links this to some other misconceptions that created a consensus around the Euro 
in the 1990s (2013).
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One misconception was the idea that a single currency would provide the Portu-
guese economy with a protective umbrella against global ﬁ nancial instability. This 
was clearly a misguided perception of the European Institutions as their subsequent 
functioning has embodied a neo-liberal programme and diverged away from any 
progressive “Social Europe” or European “community” agenda, orientated towards 
the defence of human rights, social cohesion and full employment (2013, 93). 
Moreover, the Eurozone has destroyed the nation-states’ well-established 
stabilising economic mechanisms and has forced less competitive economies to 
operate under the rules of a strong currency and policies designed to serve interests 
of the locomotive of Europe, Germany. The Eurozone did not protect peripheral 
countries as surplus capitals from Central and Northern economies have ﬂ ooded 
the country due to low interest rates and intense external push for credit taking. In 
the mid-1990’s the Portuguese families and companies were below the European 
average in terms of indebtedness levels but the institutional “oĜ  cial optimism” 
actively promoted credit-taking and invigorated the banking sector.
The second relevant misconception developed around the notion that Euro-
zone institutions were created to provide extra credibility and reputation to the 
European monetary institutions. Contrary to many prior claims, low interest rates 
did not prove to provide any singular beneﬁ t or blessing. The inﬂ ux of credit has 
coincided with the expansion of markets globalisation, which had a dramatic impact 
in Portugal. Being a less sophisticated economy, its more traditional exports (e.g. 
textiles) collapsed under the pressure of emerging economies such as China. The 
enlargement of Europe to Eastern European Countries (with low wages and high 
qualiﬁ ed labour force) has also created additional diĜ  culties to the Portuguese 
exports. In this context, the low interest rates capital did not serve the country’s ex-
ternal competitiveness but the expansion of internal consumption and non-tradable 
products such as housing and services. The economy became reliant on imports 
and services fuelled by the expansion of easy credit.
Indeed, as Rodrigues and Reis (2012, 191) point out, the co-existence of cred-
it-led and export-led models of growth in Europe “ultimately led to the creditors 
gaining the upper hand against divided debtors,” imposing deﬂ ationary policies 
that increase unemployment, the probability of defaults, and the possibility of ever 
greater political tensions. So, when the ﬁ nancial and economic crisis became shock-
ingly evident in 2008, the fractures between core and periphery in Europe became 
even more obvious. The European institutions, led de facto by Germany, defended 
the interests of the ﬁ nancial institutions and the crisis has been dealt with via the 
socialisation of debt and “adjustments” in the labour market. For critics such as 
Rodrigues and Reis (2012, 189), one core problem is that the Euro comprises “a cur-
rency without a sovereign state on the same scale” and this means that there is liĴ le 
capacity for managing imbalances or tensions in a way that avoids “turning labour 
and social conditions into the main variables of adjustment to crises” (Rodrigues 
and Reis 2012, 189). This is precisely what has happened in the Portuguese case.
The already diĜ  cult economic situation deteriorated rapidly during the most 
acute phase of the ﬁ nancial crisis from 2008 to 2010. Unable to cope with a mounting 
public debt and market speculation, the socialist government led by José Sócrates 
announced severe austerity measures in 2010 (taxes, cuts in public services, etc.) to 
reduce the state deﬁ cit that had reached 9.4 percent in 2009, one of the highest in 
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the Eurozone. Under national and international pressure the socialist government 
did not resist as one of the proposed austerity packs (the 4th Stability and Growth 
Program) was not approved by Parliament on March 2011. In these circumstances, 
José Sócrates resigned paving the way for the troika intervention in yet another 
European country.
This external intervention from the troika was enthusiastically supported by the 
right-wing parties that gained a Parliamentary majority in the 2011 elections (Social 
Democratic Party and Popular Party). Despite the profound diě erences between 
Portugal, Greece and Ireland (and the nature of their economic problems), the recipe 
was basically the same: rapid budgetary adjustment, labour market ﬂ exibilisation, 
changes in the housing market, cuts in social provisions and privatisation of state 
property. The May 20113 Memorandum of Understanding was framed by the gov-
erning parties and by the media as “foreign help” to the Portuguese state as we 
will demonstrate later in this article. In mainstream media and political discourse, 
there was an overarching consensus regarding the need of this “help” and there 
was a popular belief that this “support” would bring about beĴ er living conditions. 
During the electoral campaign, the present-day (2014) Prime Minister, Pedro Passos 
Coelho, promised that salaries would not be cut and taxes would not be increased. 
The opposite has happened and severe austerity measures were implemented.
The administration of this remedy was profoundly violent for the vast major-
ity of the population. The March 2014 report of the National Statistics Institute4
concerning “Income and Living Conditions” says that in 2012, 18.7 percent of the 
population (around 2 million) live below the poverty line with a monthly income 
of 400€ or less. This is the highest level since 2005 and it represents an increase of 
17.9 percent compared to 2011. Another concerning poverty indicator relates to 
families with children. According to INE (24 March 2014, 1), the poverty risk is 
particularly acute for mono-parental families with one child (33.6 percent) and fam-
ilies with two adults and three or more children (40.4 percent). These cold ﬁ gures 
explain news about children who fainted at school due to malnourishment and it 
also partly explains the increasing eě orts of school communities and civil society 
associations to provide food in various ways for children and their families even 
during holiday periods.
The latest report on living conditions however does not merely speak about the 
impoverishment of the population. Indeed, not everybody’s situation is geĴ ing 
worst. Some of the biggest economic groups such as Jerónimo Martins and Sonae
(Jornal de Negócios,5 25 February 2014; Público,6 19 February 2014) saw their proﬁ ts 
rocket from 2012 to 2013. According to the President of AMI (Assistência Médica 
Internacional), Fernando Nobre, the situation is alarming: “over the last year the 
100 richest persons in Portugal saw their fortunes increase by a 1/3” (in Diário
Económico,7 26 March 2014).
Poverty is inexorably linked to unemployment, the most dramatic development 
of this sovereign debt crisis. Portugal’s unemployment was 3.9 percent in 2000 and 
it increased steadily ever since hinting at the structural diĜ  culties of the economy 
within the Eurozone. In 2010 (with austerity measures already in place but without 
the troika), the ﬁ gure went up to 10.8 percent and it has expanded steadily since 
then: 12.7 percent in 2011, 15.7 percent in 2012 and 16.3 percent in 2013.8 According 
to INE, in the last three years of oĜ  cial ﬁ gures (2010, 2011 and 2012), 563.000 jobs 
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were lost.9 In 2012, young people (aged 25 to 34) were the most aě ected in terms 
of job losses.10
Poverty, unemployment, job insecurity are profoundly linked with the massive 
migration of highly qualiﬁ ed young people to European countries, Angola, Mozam-
bique, Brazil and other destinations. This is the biggest outgoing ﬂ ow of Portuguese 
population since the 1960s when the authoritarian regime led by Oliveira Salazar 
ruled the country. It is estimated that since 2008, more than 100,000 people left the 
country every single year. According to INE demographic ﬁ gures, in 2012, 51,958 
people left the country for more than a year (long term migrants) and 69,460 left 
the country for a period between 3 months and 1 year (temporary migrants) (INE, 
2013). For a country of 10 million people, the migration of more than 100,000 peo-
ple per year (mostly young and educated) is bound to have a major impact on its 
future prospects. This outﬂ ow is not in any way compensated by an non-national 
population inﬂ ux (for more, see INE 2013). Concomitantly from 2001 to 2012, the 
birth rate in Portugal has steadily declined. The latest oĜ  cial ﬁ gures (2012) show 
that this decline has reached an historic low of 89,800 births per year, the smallest 
ﬁ gure since the year 1900 (INE 2013, 38). 
Thus in summary terms, migration, unemployment and the unprecedented 
reduction of social rights are the most obvious signs of the so-called “adjustment” 
process and such fundamental shifts imply a structural change in societal power 
relations. In 2014, poverty has increased whilst the public debt has expanded to 
a record 129 percent of the GDP. The politicians’ discourses on the success of the 
troika intervention and heroic adjustment of the country are struggling with reality 
as the vast majority of the population perceives it.
Institutions against Citizens
The Memorandum of Understanding11 signed in May 2001 by the troika and 
the Portuguese state, namely by the outgoing Socialist Party and the incoming 
centre-right government parties (Social Democratic Party and Popular Party) is 
the centre-piece of the austerity policy. Under ﬁ erce market speculation and strug-
gling to avoid bankruptcy, the country handed out its sovereignty and asked for a 
ﬁ nancial “rescue” programme. The €78.000 million loan programme was aĴ ached 
to austerity measures encompassing all governmental sectorial areas from ﬁ scal 
policies to education. Financial assistance was made subject to quarterly reviews to 
be carried out between the ﬁ rst quarter of 2011 and (the 12th and last) the second 
quarter of 2014.
As in other EU states, this detailed Memorandum of Understanding sets out 
very speciﬁ c targets for reduction of state expenditure and revenue increase, namely 
through the “sliming” of the state’s functions and social security provisions and the 
generalised and substantial hiking of taxation. Moreover, the document describes 
the privatisation programme naming the companies that should be privatised. 
The labour market and education are thoroughly inscribed in the document well 
in line with the neo-liberal frame that underlines the programme: ﬂ exibilisation 
of labour conditions, precariousness, cuts in unemployment beneﬁ ts, matching 
human capital with labour market.
The social democrats – which took power in the June 5th 2011 elections – have 
used the memorandum as part of the electoral strategy puĴ ing the programme 
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under a constructive light. The enthusiasm for the programme was such that the 
elected Prime Minister publicly said that the State would be able to “go beyond the 
Troika” (Público, 6 June 2011). Pedro Passos Coelho explained that the country did 
not wish to be a “burden to (our) partners” and therefore it would do “whatever 
necessary” to fulﬁ l all commitments and “regain the trust of the markets” (Diário
de Notícias,12 6 June 2011). 
Despite the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, the Socialist Party 
(led by António José Seguro between the 2011 legislative elections and late 2014) 
soon started to drift away from subsequent policy initiatives. The socialists favoured 
a diě erent path to fulﬁ l the Memorandum’s objectives. Still, their role has been quite 
ambiguous given that any serious aĴ empts to further distance themselves from the 
austerity measures has been met with an eě ective two-pronged accusation: they 
were the ones who signed the agreement with the external entities and they were 
the ones who lead the country to a situation whereby assistance was inevitable.
However simplistic these arguments may seem the fact is that for the most part 
they have been suĜ  cient to paralyse the socialists, the biggest opposition party, 
hence creating the notion of a broad consensus amongst the three main parties of 
the so-called “arch of power” (the Popular Party, the Social Democratic Party and 
the Socialist Party). Openly alternative thinking in Parliament could only be found 
amongst the two leftist parties: Bloco de Esquerda (Leftist Block) and the Communist 
Party, both of them not truly perceived as governing alternatives.
The “manufacture of consent,” to use the famous notion of Walter Lippmann 
(1922/2012) has not been promoted merely by the governing parties with the com-
placency of the Socialist Party and the mainstream media. The President of the 
Republic, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, has been a key ﬁ gure in the process. Despite some 
initial hesitancy, Cavaco Silva has more recently been voicing a strong defence of 
the troika measures and the inevitable deepening of austerity in the post-troika 
period, that is, after 2014. In March 2014, he has published a Preface of Roteiros
VIII13 where, once again, the Portuguese people were asked to remain peaceful, 
accepting the inescapable payment of the public debt in full, along an arduous path 
to be undertaken at least until 2035.
Furthermore, this impetus to promote a wider political consensus has also en-
listed the President of the European Commission until late 2014, Durão Barroso (a 
Portuguese himself) who has often argued for the need of a post-troika governing 
arrangement between the three “arch of power” parties (Expresso14 29 March 2014, 8). 
According to this discursive frame, the Portuguese people are suě ering the 
austerity measures because they have not been ﬁ nancially responsible in the 
past and should in the future behave along the lines of the Germans: “Instead of 
criticizing Germany, let’s do what Germany has done. It has reformed itself and 
today the country can be tranquil. Portugal has a fantastic opportunity to become 
a modern country, to transform this crisis into an opportunity” (Barroso in Expresso
29 March 2014, 8).
Whilst high oĜ  ce politicians incessantly advocated meekness in face of inevita-
ble austerity measures, signs of resistance began to emerge namely through recur-
rent street protests. To a growing number of people it became diĜ  cult to absorb 
the rationale behind a statement like the one made by the Parliamentary leader of 
the Social Democratic Party, Luís Montenegro: “people’s lives are not beĴ er but 
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the country is.”15 The schizophrenic division between the “people,” living in worst 
conditions, and the “country” that is, in Luis Montenegro’s view, performing beĴ er 
(the trade balance has improved and interests rates are lower) sheds light onto the 
understanding of a political system whose central axis has shifted away from the 
community that it is supposed to represent.
Not surprisingly, the gap between government (and political parties) and citizens 
has been widening, as politicians seem gradually detached from everyday diĜ  -
culties. In addition to the more notorious public demonstrations (mostly orderly), 
the popular distrust can also be discerned in the electoral success of independent 
candidates in the 2013 local elections. Around 7 percent of the local government 
independent candidates won seats.16 The vice-president of the National Association 
for Independent Local Government Movements, Maria Teresa Serrenho, consid-
ered that the increase in independent seats reﬂ ected the “desolation of citizens” 
with the political apparatus.17 Even if political analysts have pointed out that some 
independent candidates result from internal party divisions, the victory of non-par-
tisan candidates demonstrates that parties themselves were not understood as a 
critical backup for those candidacies. Independent candidates, for example, now 
run important cities such as Oporto and Matosinhos. 
The mainstream media replication of the oĜ  cial discourse didn’t help citizens 
to decode the reasons behind the dramatic changes taking place in their lives. 
However, a more informed and intellectually sophisticated consensus has been 
evolving in the Portuguese society around the recognition that austerity measures 
are aggravating (not solving) the economic problems themselves and that the exter-
nal public debt needs an eĜ  cient restructuring process. On the 12th of March 2014, 
74 well known personalities from the most diverse ideological backgrounds came 
to the fore with a Manifesto “To prepare the debt restructuring for a sustainable 
growth” (in Público 12 March 2014, 4–6). The 74 personalities included economic 
advisors to the President of the Republic, former ﬁ nance ministers from diě erent 
political sensibilities, representatives of both labour and business associations, 
academics, intellectuals and others.
The main argument of these 74 personalities is that the response to the pres-
ent-day crisis cannot succeed without addressing the public debt in articulation 
with the economic growth and job creation within a framework of cohesion and 
eě ective solidarity (in Público 12 March 2014, 4).
The Manifesto has unleashed a massive negative response from the government 
and opinion makers alike. The President of the European Commision, Durão Bar-
roso, has also come to the fore to criticise two former ﬁ nance ministers from social 
democratic-led governments, Manuela Ferreira Leite and Bagão Félix, for having 
signed the Manifesto (Expresso 29 March 2014: 07). He has explained their decision 
to sign the Manifesto as a result of the loss of income they had personally suě ered: 
“both Manuela Ferreira Leite and Bagão Felix represent a certain middle-class that 
lived relatively well but they were hit by this situation” (Expresso 29 March 2014, 7)
In the words of Manuel Carvalho, the irritation the Manifesto has caused is the 
best proof of its relevance and success: “For once, Portugal is debating its future 
outside the frame imposed by the government. For a moment, one is back to the 
political debate only to realize that there is life beyond the oĜ  cial truth and the con-
ditioned debate by the markets susceptibilities” (Carvalho in Público 16 March 2014).18
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Fragile Mainstream Media
In late March 2014 a Portuguese junior minister asked a group of selected 
journalists to aĴ end a private brieﬁ ng at the Finance ministry on pensions and 
civil service pay cutbacks planned for 2015. The journalists all agreed to use com-
ments made in that room without quoting the source (“oĜ  cial ministry source” 
was the preferred formulation) and to respect a speciﬁ c time embargo. When the 
“news” was eventually published the prime minister himself promptly dismissed 
it as “noise” and as “manipulation” and two distinct senior ministers referred to 
it as no more than “speculation.”19 The editors of the seven media outlets, whose 
reporting had been put into questioning, immediately issued a joint statement 
guaranteeing that their journalists abided by the formal agreement jointly made 
with the junior minister.20
This brief summation of what naturally was a far more intricate aě air is brought 
forward as an example of the current frailty of editorial decision-making in Por-
tugal; journalists increasingly accept a diminished role in the news-worthiness 
framing of the agenda, and increasingly accept a role as conduits of governmental 
“testing-the-waters” communication strategies (Maarek 2007). The seven media 
outlets which have accepted to play an active part in what has eventually surfaced 
as a botched spinning manoeuvre are simply the country’s most important dailies 
(Correio da Manhã, Jornal de Notícias, Diário de Notícias, and Público), the national 
news agency (Lusa), and two very relevant economic publications (Diário Económico
and Dinheiro Vivo).
If we were thus to look upon this with the useful conceptual contribution of 
Hallin we would note that on this particular issue the bulk of media production 
veers away from a “sphere of legitimate controversy” privileging instead a “sphere 
of consensus” one (1986, 116–117). Yet, unlike the situation lived by American 
journalists after September 11, in which “they felt connected and important to their 
audience (…) they felt appreciated as they rarely do” (Schudson 2008, 82–83), the 
consensual “we” appears in this instance to connect them to political and economic 
elites rather than to their audience.
The Portuguese media’s pre-emptive eě orts to disclose the potential problems of 
ailing national banking institutions, of stressed real estate markets or of struggling 
public accounts in the ﬁ rst years of this century were not very adamant (with a 
very few notable exceptions21) and the “sudden” appearance of a crisis from 2008 
onwards dented credibilities. The media responded by substantially increasing 
aĴ ention to ﬁ nancial and economic topics whilst adopting a stance that promoted 
notions of national guilt and the ensuing necessity to “pay our dues.” In an assess-
ment of journalistic performance before the crisis, the Economy editor of a national 
TV channel, Luis Ferreira Lopes, would write: “in the future we must all act faster 
(…) the issue of trust is increasingly more important for the banking business but 
also for the TV business” (2009, 41).
A recent study analysing the main news bulletin of a national TV channel, SIC, 
between 2007 and 2011, noted that two categories – “ﬁ nancial crisis” and “economy 
and business” accounted for 68.4 percent of all the news stories and that in 28.9 
percent of those bulletins they were given opening status. “Financial crisis” occu-
pied in 2007 1.4 percent of the total time of the bulletins and by 2011 it accounted 
for 8.7 percent of the total time (Fragoso 2013, 99–107).
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The perceived lack of valuable information thus gave way to an overﬂ ow of 
information; suddenly households were surrounded by news regarding rating agen-
cies, the “weight” of national debt – often presented through the “each Portuguese 
owes X to foreign creditors” formula – subprime or toxic investments. From 2010 
onwards the mainstream media increasingly confronted the eroded minority so-
cialist government voicing both political opposition concerns and social uneasiness 
resulting from the ﬁ rst austerity measures. It would later emerge that a signiﬁ cant 
part of that shift was linked to a deliberate eě ort – in both speciﬁ c media outlets 
but also in digital environments, like blogs and social networks – to promote the 
proﬁ le of the social democrat alternative to government (Carvalho 2013).22
The excessive proximity between a newly elected majority government and 
mainstream media is not exactly a novelty within the Portuguese political context 
(Cunha 2013, 25). That should however neither keep us from noting the particu-
larities of the current situation nor from equating them in the context of a broader 
analysis of media discourse surrounding the on-going ﬁ nancial and economic crisis.
Indeed, Portuguese mainstream media’s endeavours to reverberate the existence 
of a broad national consensus on key aspects of the government’s strategy to deal 
with the crisis – the semantic preference for “savings” in lieu of “cuts,” the emphatic 
usage of speciﬁ c frames like “the overgrown/fat State,” “the unmanageable social 
security system,” or the “rationalisation of services,” the deliberate increased pro-
ﬁ le given to ﬁ nancial related themes and actors, the de-personalisation of national 
creditors (mostly mentioned as “ﬁ nancial markets” or “investors”), and also the 
active involvement of journalistic national household names in the publication 
of books with titles like “Enough!,” “Get out of the way!”’ or “My government 
programme” – result from a very peculiar combination of debilitating processes 
of change aě ecting the media.
The ﬁ rst of these processes is what might broadly be described as Portuguese 
media’s poor handling of the digitisation induced transformations occurred since 
the beginning of this century.
Although some of the major media outlets did manage to have an online presence 
in tandem with internationally known operations (the ﬁ rst recorded presence, Jornal 
de Notícias, occurred in 2005) very few steps were taken to evolve past a shovel-
ware strategy (Bastos 2010) and most signiﬁ cantly a severe undervaluation of the 
internet’s potential for the creation of thematic information driven outlets and for 
autonomous small ad spaces resulted in an overall erosion of audience and revenue.
It should in fairness be pointed out that most Portuguese media groups emerged 
only in the 1990’s and their primary goal in the ﬁ rst years of existence – adhering 
to an EU vision of media centred on economic rather than socio-cultural interests 
(Michalis 2011) – was to respond to the challenges of an overproduction and in-
creasingly deindustrialisation scenario already under way in other countries (Meyer 
2004; Brock 2013). The impetus was directed at platform convergence initiatives 
(sometimes cooperative and sometimes competitive) in order to reduce costs. At the 
heart of some of these changes were news production reformulations with profound 
labour relations impacts, like the alteration of job descriptions, working schedules 
and payment structures. This in turn favoured the beginning of the externalisation 
of services and the increased dependency on freelancers and interns (Garcia 2010).23
If anything the ensuing ﬁ nancial and economic crisis only accentuated the corrosive 
eě ects of these measures on journalistic production.
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The second process is the context of ﬁ nancial and economic crisis itself. The 
disappearance from the Portuguese economy of an estimated 29 B€ (resulting from 
imposed austerity measures) between 2011 and 201524 naturally had a severe eě ect 
on internal consumption indexed activities like advertising and media content 
production, compounding a debilitated situation which had been noted at least 
since 2004. In the timeframe of a decade – 2004 to 2013 – the Portuguese advertis-
ing market was cut by nearly half (from 720 M€ in 2007 to 390 M€ in 2013) and the 
combined revenues of the three publicly traded Portuguese media groups (Impresa,
Media Capital and Coﬁ na) were cut by 35 percent. These three groups suě ered losses 
of 80M€ in 2008 and 29M€ in 2011, partially oě set by gains of 11M€ in 2012 and 25 
M€ in 2013 (Nobre 2014).
A comparative study of the share value of 29 media groups listed in the stock 
markets of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain between 2007 and 2012 found 
that the average loss of value exceeded 20 percent. Portugal’s groups performance 
was as follows: Impresa’s value decreased 85.51 percent, Media Capital’s decreased 
80.5 percent, Zon’s decreased 63.51 percent, and only Coﬁ na’s rose by 43.9 percent 
(Fernández 2013,121).
According to the Portuguese circulation association (APCT) between 2008 and 
2013 the overall circulation of the main national newspapers declined substantial-
ly; Correio da Manhã lost 3.85 percent, Diário de Notícias lost 49.94 percent, Jornal de 
Notícias lost 34.16 percent, Público lost 37.13 percent and the main weekly, Expresso,
lost 20.89 percent.25
Facing a severe decrease in advertising revenue and an accentuation of a ten-
dency for audience loss, debilitated media groups have been forced to “talk about 
restructuring without liquidity” (Fernández 2013, 122) enhancing convergence/
cost reduction initiatives and favouring content strategies less devoted to the more 
expensive production of hard news and much more in tune with an aĴ ention to 
entertainment spirit (Campos-Freire 2011).
The third process relates to Portugal’s colonial past and it results from the 
propitious combination between the severe short-term ﬁ nancial diĜ  culties of the 
major media groups and the notable investment interests of the Angolan political 
and economic elite.
The notion that this restricted elite should take it upon themselves to hasten 
a “primitive accumulation of capital” – as explained by the President, José Edu-
ardo dos Santos, in a “State of the Nation” address to Parliament in October 2013 
(Santos 2013, 13) – had been promoted internally since 2002 and its expansion and 
diversiﬁ cation rationale targeted Portugal’s ailing building, real estate and banking 
businesses as apt investment opportunities from 2007 onwards.
The newfound proximity, between penurious businesses of a former colonial 
power and the ebullient elite of a former colony was actively promoted by a broad 
spectrum of Portuguese politicians, some of them eventually being deemed appro-
priate to integrate managing boards or advisory boards in the existing or newly 
founded companies (Costa et al 2014, 97–101).26
The presence of Angolan capital in Portuguese media groups began in 2009 and 
has been growing steadily ever since. In the absence of a single clear cut explanation 
for the strategic combined entry of several formally distinct Angolan entities a few 
signs should be highlighted; ﬁ rst and foremost, Angolan investments in the Portu-
guese banking sector implied the acquisition of a creditor position with indebted 
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Portuguese media groups; secondly, media production on mutual interest maĴ ers 
has always been perceived by both countries (at least by both countries elites’) as 
very relevant, sometimes in a somewhat over-sensitive manner.27
The intricate web of relations created by Angolan capital in Portugal between 
the interests of those closest to the economic and political elites on both countries 
added content frailty to an already debilitated sector. These acquisitions have no 
doubt played a role in both the increased prominence of overtly positive narratives 
about Angola and its entrepreneurship but also in the disappearance (or margin-
alisation to autonomous websites) from the media agenda of dissenting voices.
By the same token, selective changes in managerial boards and even editorial 
leaderships ensured the maintenance of a less than hostile stance towards the cur-
rent Portuguese government. Going back to the seven media outlets quoted earlier 
it should thus not be surprising to say that ﬁ ve of them belong either to Coﬁ na or 
Controlinveste, both now controlled by Angolan capital.
Hopeless Mainstream Discourses
In November 2012 the New York Times published in the Europe section of its 
international news site a photographic gallery entitled “Portugal passes another 
austere budget.” Each of the 17 black and white photos tells an individual story of 
strife against the consequences of the crisis; under an image of Rosa Serra Pereira, 
a middle-aged woman who lives in a small Lisbon apartment with six dependents, 
we can read: “In Portugal, austerity means that hospitals are closing, and state ben-
eﬁ ts, public wages and pensions are being cut. New taxes have been added and old 
taxes increased.” Under a photo of homeless men gathered outside a church where 
free food is distributed we read: “The government had been winning praise from 
international lenders who last year negotiated a bailout worth about $101 billion, 
following similar deals with Greece and Ireland.”28
Having been presented just two weeks after a major general strike, which joined 
Portugal and Spain, this news feature – described by the most inﬂ uential weekly, 
Expresso, as a bleak portrait of the country29 – had a considerable impact, to the 
point of being mentioned by politicians and political commentators alike. 
Especially from 2011 onwards news produced by foreign media about Portugal’s 
ﬁ nancial, economic, and social situation generally became very relevant to inter-
nal political discussions. A country with diminished sovereignty, ruled by a very 
compliant government with the acquiescence of a debilitated mainstream media 
developed a necessity – on diě erent sides of the political and social debates – to 
seek out some sort of reassurance in those external reports. As such, news about the 
overall governmental success in aĴ aining the goals jointly set out with the troika 
would naturally become as useful in the defence of the adopted strategy as much as 
news prompted by less favourable descriptions of Portugal’s dire situation would 
fuel opposition claims for a signiﬁ cant policy change. 
Most favoured by both camps would become the opinions of internationally 
reputed economists – Nobel laureates acquiring a rather special status. Paul Krug-
man, for instance, devoted some of his New York Times columns to Portugal from 
2011 through to 2013, with a very signiﬁ cant impact. In January 2011 he would 
“announce” that Portugal would be “the next eurodomino,”30 a few months later 
he would state that Greece, Ireland, and Portugal “would not be able to pay their 
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debts in full,”31 and roughly a year later, on receiving a Honoris Causa Doctorate 
from Lisbon University, he would add that Portuguese salaries should devaluate 
some 30 percent.32 By May 2013, under the heading “Nightmare in Portugal,” the 
2008 Nobel laureate would reﬂ ect on a dire portrait of the country published a few 
days earlier by the Financial Times by saying: “Don’t tell me that Portugal has had 
bad policies in the past and has deep structural problems. Of course it has; so does 
everyone, and while arguably Portugal’s are worse than those of some other coun-
tries, how can it possibly make sense to ‘deal’ with these problems by condemning 
vast numbers of willing workers to unemployment?”33
Portuguese mainstream media aĴ ention has thus not strayed too far from an 
excessive inward looking focus, capturing into the discourse on the crisis most 
relevant external references to the country and recuperating, in a peculiar manner, 
traces from a self-doubting discourse on the worth of the nation ﬁ rst enunciated 
more than a century ago (Queirós and Ortigão 1873/2004, 312).
Notable exceptions to this predominance were references to other European 
countries in diĜ  culties (PIIGS) – especially the broad “we are not like Greece” 
topic – the election of François Hollande for the French Presidency in May 2012 
(given the perception that it would soften Germany’s overbearing inﬂ uence in 
European ﬁ nancial and economic decisions), European Central Bank policy deci-
sions, and EU summits where common strategies to deal with the crisis have been 
debated (namely the topic of debt mutualisation). Discussions on broader issues 
of European policy and especially debates on other than short-term alternatives 
have been on the whole side-lined from mainstream media, ﬁ nding their way into 
thematic programmes on cable TV news channels or into sparse items on specialised 
business newspapers/magazines.
This peculiar take on events and the apparent lack of aĴ ention to larger for-
ward looking strategies for the EU is, however, not a great departure from what 
had happened in pre-crisis years. Indeed Portugal has always been portrayed by 
mainstream media (and perceived by most citizens) as a peripheral country allowed 
to enter a special group at the expense of some part of its sovereignty. Europe has, 
in that sense, traditionally been much more of an external entity with increasing 
power over national aě airs (and indeed daily life) than as a “part of us.”
Concluding Remarks
In this article we tried to clarify the fundamental features of the economic and 
ﬁ nancial crisis in Portugal and its socio-political consequences. We have seen how 
deeply the crisis has aě ected common people with a dramatic increase in poverty, 
unemployment and migration. Some dimensions of the crisis are more diĜ  cult 
to measure and to demonstrate with ﬁ gures but there are numerous reports and 
statements from state oĜ  cials and academics alike, which highlight the increase 
in suicide rates, the increase in medicine consumption (e.g. anti-depressive) and 
dissatisfaction with labour conditions. Obviously, it is diĜ  cult to establish a direct 
link between crisis and health. However the Health Minister, Paulo Macedo, has 
publically stated several times that the crisis is having an impact on Health.
The precariousness of labour conditions (praised by the troika) and the reduction 
of advertising revenues have also complicated the already fragile media sector and 
the journalistic reporting of the crisis. When the economic and ﬁ nancial crisis hit 
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the Portuguese media, the hardship was already there. The economic stagnation 
over the previous decade (since Portugal joined the Eurozone) did not favour the 
development of alternative business models and the Portuguese media had seri-
ous diĜ  culties dealing with the digitalisation and the migration of aĴ ention from 
traditional media to online platforms. Whilst struggling with the new multi-plat-
form environment and increasing fragmentation of aĴ ention, the economic and 
ﬁ nancial crisis has severely deepened the already existing problems particularly 
via the reduction of advertising revenues.
In addition, the media were exposed to the direct and indirect, overt and covert, 
investments of Angolan elites in the Portuguese media since 2009 causing much 
speculation and uncertainty in the newsrooms as ownership and editorial lines 
frequently became diĜ  cult to read for journalists and the public. 
Blurred objectives, job insecurity, and the increase of daily pressure due to the 
reduction of newsrooms created the perfect seĴ ing for a less critical journalism. The 
troika and the “arch of power” discourses were basically absorbed and reproduced 
by the mainstream media. Alternative discourses did exist but they were either 
marginalised or framed as radical (anti-patriotic even). Diě erently from social 
network movements and street demonstrations,34 generalist and economic media 
have been part of the “manufacture of consent” about the troika’s programme.
Notes:
1. http://www.ionline.pt/artigos/portugal/passos-coelho-critica-comunicacao-social-destacar-
pode-correr-mal-portugal/pag/-1 (25 March 2014).
2. The title “Porque devemos sair do Euro” might be translated as ‘”Why should we leave the Euro.” 
The authors are responsible for all translations in this paper.
3. Portugal: Memorandum of Understanding on Specifi c Economic Policy Conditionality, 3 
May 2012 (Agreement signed by the European Commission, European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund and the Portuguese State). http://www.portugal.gov.pt: accessed in 
28 March 2014.
4. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística). Destaque, Rendimento e Condições de Vida 2013 (dados 
Provisórios) 24 March 2014, 1–15.
5. Jornal de Negócios is a daily economic newspaper.
6. Público is a generalist daily newspaper.
7. Diário Económico is daily economic newspaper.
8. Data from The National Statistics Institute and Pordata, INE/Pordata,www.pordata.pt: accessed 
in 27 April 2014.
9. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística). 2014. Destaque, Anuário Estatístico de Portugal 2012. 7 
February 2014, 5.
10. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística). 2014. Destaque, Anuário Estatístico de Portugal 2012. 7 
of February 2014, 5.
11. Portugal: Memorandum of Understanding on Specifi c Economic Policy Conditionality, 3 
May 2012 (Agreement signed by the European Commission, European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund and the Portuguese State). http://www.portugal.gov.pt: accessed in 
28 March 2014.
12. Diário de Notícias is a daily generalista newspaper.
13. Roteiros VIII is published in the President’s offi  cial site: http://www.presidencia.pt/ accessed in 
30 March 2014.
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14. Expresso is a weekly generalist newspaper.
15. Interview to Jornal de Notícias in 21 February 2014 in http://www.jn.pt/live/entrevistas, 
accessed in 30 March 2014.
16. Electoral offi  cial results in http://www.autarquicas2013.pt: accessed in 29 March 2014
17. Interview to TSF in www. tsf.pt: accessed 28 March 2014.
18. In http://www.publico.pt (31 March 2014).
19. http://rr.sapo.pt/informacao_detalhe.aspx?fi d=1&did=143456 (27 March 2014).
20. http://rr.sapo.pt/informacao_detalhe.aspx?fi d=27&did=143469 (28 March 2014).
21. One counter-current example was the publication by Exame of an extensive dossier on the 
troubles of BPN – a bank nationalised in 2008 with estimated losses for the State exceeding €4 
billion – in its edition of 21 March 2001.
22. Furthermore, a number of journalists who lead these changes (namely in Diário de Notícias) 
would later leave the profession to occupy positions within the new social-democrat led 
governmental structure.
23. Between 2004 and 2009 the number of offi  cial interns (these only include those under contract 
with the companies and registered with the professional title awarding entity – CCPJ) rose from 
5 percent to 10 percent of the total number of journalists (Rebelo 2011, 57). For a perhaps more 
accurate overview of the situation we should at least add the impact of the curricular internship 
programmes of more than 30 Ba and 50 MA programmes (with periods ranging from one to six 
months).
24. http://expresso.sapo.pt/austeridade-tira-29-mil-milhoes-de-euros-aos-portugueses=f862270 
(25 March 2014).
25. These fi gures compare offi  cial circulation fi gures between the fi rst bimester of 2008 and the 
fi rst bimester of 2013. Available here: http://www.apct.pt/Analise_simples.php (26 March 2014).
26. According to the study conducted by Costa et al these fl uent interchanges took 27 former 
members of Portuguese governments into the boards of companies and groups operating mainly 
in Angola (strictly Angolan, of Angolan capital majority, of mixed Angolan-Portuguese capital 
or of Brazilian-Angolan capital), and prompted 120 others to positions in 17 distinct Portuguese 
economic groups with Angolan capital since 2007.
27. The former Angolan prime minister (1992–1996) and CPLP’s fi rst Executive Secretary (1996–
2000) wrote the following on his personal blog: “In Portugal, I see exactly what I predicted. 
Businessmen, diplomats and even intellectuals, fall to their knees asking Portuguese newspapers 
not to touch the little problems of Angolan dignataries, like the world known issues with General 
Bento Kangamba. For that to be mentioned in France, in Brazil, in the USA or elsewhere is OK, but 
not here in Portugal, “oh no, please no.” (http://marcolinomoco.com/?p=888, 31 October 2013).
28. http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2012/11/27/world/europe/20121128-PORTUGAL.html#1 
(24 March 2014).
29. http://expresso.sapo.pt/the-new-york-times-mostra-portugal-como-um-pais-
desolador=f770510 (24 March 2014).
30. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/portugal-o-nao/ (25 March 2014).
31. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/opinion/23krugman.
html?scp=1&sq=Portugal+Krugman&st=cse (25 March 2014).
32. http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/Economia/Interior.aspx?content_id=2327057 (25 March 2014).
33. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/27/nightmare-in-portugal/ (25 March 2014).
34. From March 2011 until March 2013 Portugal had fi ve major massive moments of national 
uprising, some of them gathering almost one million people in several major cities (a recent 
national internal security report revealed that 3012 acts of protest were accounted for by police in 
2012 and 2859 were registered in 2013).
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